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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
jurisdiction, since the presence of representatives would evidence
an intent to perform purposeful acts in New York.9 Seemingly,
the Court in McKee has qualified this proposition so that where
the visits of the representative are few and the primary purpose
is to participate in general discussions that fail to accomplish sub-
stantial results, there is no purposeful activity in New York suf-
ficient to constitute a transaction of business.
To construe CPLR 302(a)(1) otherwise would, as observed
by the Court of Appeals, create a risk of in personam jurisdiction
as to any corporation "whose officers or sales personnel happen
to pass the time of day with a New York customer in New
York. .. . "10
CPLR 302(a)(3): Recent Developnwnts.
Under New York's amended long-arm statute, personal juris-
diction may be exercised over non-domiciliaries who commit tor-
tious acts without the state causing injury within the state if
certain criteria are met. ' The original tort provision of the
CPLR, 302 (a) (2), still found in the statute, allowed for personal
jurisdiction to be exercised over non-domiciliaries who committed
tortious acts within the state.' 2
While the Supreme Court of Illinois had interpreted its long-
arm statute-similar to and a model for the New York act-to
include a tortious act originating outside the state culminating in
injury within the state to be a tortious act committed within the
state,13 the New York Court of Appeals, in Feathers v. McLucas,4
gave a strict and literal interpretation to CPLR 302(a) (2), stating
that the language of the statute was "too plain and precise" to
0 See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary 91 (1966).
1020 N.Y.2d at 382, 229 N.E.2d at 607, 283 N.Y.S2d at 37.
"1That is, the defendant must:
(1) regularly do or solicit business in New York, or
(2) engage in a persistent course of conduct within the state, or
derive substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered
in New York. CPLR 302(a) (3) (i). Or the defendant must:
(1) expect or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences
in New York, and
(2) derive substantial revenue from interstate or international com-
merce. CPLR 302(a) (3) (ii).
CPLR 302(a) (2).
13Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 23 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The Ohio manufacturer of a defective valve
which caused injury in Illinois was held to be within the "tortious
act" provision of Illinois' long-arm statute since there could be no dis-
tinction between the negligent act of manufacturing and the injury caused
thereby.
14 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). See generally
The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHx's L. Rv. 122,
134 (1965).
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permit it to include a tortious act committed without the state
which caused injury within the state.1,
As a result of the Court of Appeals' decision, New York's
long-arm statute would not reach a non-resident who, by a tor-
tious act without the State, caused injury within the State.-' Ex-
panding the jurisdictional scope of the New York courts to include
the extraterritorial tortious acts of non-residents became, as sug-
gested in Feathers,' a matter for the legislature rather than the
judiciary. An amendment proposed by the Judicial Conference",
was adopted by the Legislature and became effective September 1,
1966.' The amendment permits a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose tortious act without the
state causes injury within the state if, first, he regularly engages
in business or other course of conduct or derives substantial revenue
from New York or, second, he can foresee his act having conse-
quences in New York and he derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce.2 0
Recently, two cases of first impression were brought challeng-
ing service made under authority of 302 (a) (3). In Brown v.
Erie Lackawanna R.R.,21 a non-resident defendant's freight car
was leased to the co-defendant, a New York railroad. Plaintiff's
intestate was killed when the box car went out of control and
hit the car which he was driving. The court sustained juris-
diction on the basis of CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii).22 Defendant's
usual practice of leasing its rolling stock for use in various states
by other railroads was found by the court a sufficient basis to
maintain jurisdiction since the defendant derived substantial
revenue from interstate commerce even though there was an ab-
sence of any proof as to amount. Moreover, the test to determine
whether a defendant expects or reasonably can expect an act to
'5 15 N.Y.2d at 460, 463, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 79, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21, 23.
31 Reese, A Study of CPLR in Light of Recent Judicial Decisions,
N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENcE, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 132 (1965). See also
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 463,
471 (1967).
'. 15 N.Y2d at 464, 209 N.E.2d at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
'gJudicial Conference Report on the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 2
McKINNEY'S SESSION LAWS 2780, 2786-87 (1966) (hereinafter cited as
Judicial Conference Report).
19 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 590. For a discussion of the amendment
and its background, see generally The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, sutpra note 16.
20CPLR 302(a) (3).
21 54 Misc. 2d 225, 282 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1967).
22The court noted that while 302 (a) (3) (i) could be a basis for juris-
diction due to the solicitation of shippers and occasional financing through
banks in New York, 302(a) (3) (ii) provided a sound basis for jurisdiction.
Id. at 227, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
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have consequences in New York was interpreted by the court to
be an objective rather than a subjective one.23
Rejecting defendant's contention that plaintiff must prove a
tortious act committed outside New York, the court ruled that it
is only necessary to plead a tortious act under 302(a)(3)(ii) for
jurisdictional purposes. Further, questions of ultimate liability
were deemed properly determinable in disclosure proceedings or
at trial. The plaintiff was not required to show at the outset the
tortious act was committed outside the state. The fact that it
may have consequences in New York will not alter its "personal
localization" as a tortious act outside the state, since Feathers
dearly demonstrated that the act and injury can be separate.
In the second case Gillnwre v. J. S. Inskip, Inc., 24 plaintiff
brought an action for negligence and breach of warranty against a
Pennsylvania importer of an automobile, its English manufacturer,
and a New York dealer. The first two defendants moved to dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court, Nassau
County, denied the motion on the basis of CPLR 302(a) (3) (i).
Although the defendants had established in their moving papers
that they did not come within the "doing business" or "course of
conduct" provisions of 302 (a) (3) (i), the court decided that they
had failed to show that they did not come within the "substantial
revenue" provisions of 302 (a) (3) (i) and (ii), i.e., they failed
to show the absence of substantial revenue from New York, or
from interstate or international commerce. "Substantial revenue,"
the court stated, was to be determined by a comparison of the
defendants' New York interstate or international gross sales
revenue or net profits with the defendants' total gross sales
revenue or total net profits. The defendants here had not speci-
fied any of these figures in their motion papers.25
The Gillmore case establishes a tentative guideline to assist
New York courts in determining whether the substantial revenue
requirements of 302(a) (3) have been met." Also, the case serves
2354 Misc. 2d at 227, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 337. "If these standards [of
foreseeability] have any relevance they also indicate that the phrase 'rea-
sonably expects' should be given an objective rather than a subjective mean-
ing." See Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign
Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16 BurF-
PALo L. R-v. 67, 74 (1966).
2454 Misc. 2d 218, 282 N.Y.S2d 127 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967).
25 Id. at 220-22, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 131-33. The denial of the motion,
however, was without prejudice to defendant's right to reassert the jurisdic-
tional defense in their answer upon a showing that substantial revenue was
not derived within the meaning of the statute. 54 Misc. 2d at 222, 282
N.Y.S.2d at 133.
26 Substantial revenue is not defined in the Judicial Conference Report,
supra note 18, or in the UxnFoRm INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PRO-
cEzuR AcT § 1.03(4). There are, however, some indications of how sub-
stantial revenue might be defined. One authority, interpreting 302(a) (3) (i),felt it would connote a course of earning in New York. 7B McKINNEY'S
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as a guide to attorneys with respect to what facts and figures
should be alleged by them in drafting motions under 302 (a) (3).
However, the most significant aspect of the Gillmore case is
its treatment of the constitutionality of 302(a) (3). Jurisdiction
over the defendants under 302 (a) (3) (i) was, in the court's view,
clearly constitutional on the basis of Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp .27 The court reasoned that the "sub-
stantial revenue" provision in the CPLR 302(a) (3) (i) is predicated
on the concept that one who has derived "substantial revenue" from
the use or consumption of goods or services has sufficient contact
with New York to be subject to jurisdiction based on a tortious
act committed without the state causing injury within the state.28
Since jurisdiction over the defendants could be sustained under
302(a) (3) (i), the court was relieved of the difficult task of
deciding the constitutionality of 302 (a) (3) (ii). It noted, how-
ever, that the basis of (ii) was that, irrespective of any revenue
derived from New York, a non-domiciliary who derives substan-
tial revenue from interstate or international commerce has suf-
ficient contact with the state if he expects or reasonably should
expect his tortious act outside the state to have consequences
within the state. Despite the conclusion of the Judicial Conference 2 9
that one who met the requirements of 302(a) (3) (ii) could fairly
be considered able to handle litigation away from his business
location, on the facts of a particular case this might not be a
sufficient due process basis for jurisdiction"0 because of the "mini-
mum contacts" requirement established by International Shoe Co. v.
Washington 3l and reaffirmed in Hanson v. Denckla.3 2
While traditionally the basis for personal jurisdiction was
physical presence,33 the Supreme Court liberalized this test in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.4 Due process was there
held to require that to subject a non-resident defendant to an
CPLR 302, supp. commentary 84 (1966). See also Kramer v. Vogl, 17
N.Y.2d 27, 32, 215 N.E.2d-159, 161, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (1966), where the
Court compared the foreign corporation's total sales with its sales to the
plaintiff in New York in determining whether or not the foreign corpora-
tion transacted business in New York. See also Johnson v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 22 App. Div. 2d 138, 140, 254 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260-61 (1st
Dep't 1964), remanded for further development of record, 16 N.Y.2d 1067,
213 N.E.2d 466, 266 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1965).
2723 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E2d 761 (1961).
28 See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 18, at 2788-89.
29Id. at 2788.
30 54 Misc. 2d at 224, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 135. See Judicial Conference
Report, supra note 18, at 2788-89; 7B MCKnNEYS CPLR 302, supp. com-
mentary 85-86 (1966); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, supra
note 16.
31326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32357 U.S. 235 (1958).33 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
34326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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in personam judgment, he must have "certain minimum contacts
with [the state] . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and justice.' 35 In
the later case of Hanson v. Denckla,36 the Supreme Court observed
that due process required that there be "some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.1 37  It is within the basic constitutional
framework established by International Shoe and Hanson that
302(a) (3) (i) and (ii) must be discussed.
CPLR 302(a) (3)(i)
CPLR 302(a)(3)(i) rests upon a much stronger constitu-
tional basis than does (ii). It is a verbatim incorporation of
the text of Section 1.03(a)(4) of the Uniform Interstate and
International Procedure Act and is more restrictive than the
Illinois statute interpreted as constitutional in Gray.38 In addition,
a federal court has recently held constitutional a Virginia products-
liability provision of a long-arm statute whose requirements were
similar to 302(a) (3) (i). 39 CPLR 302(a) (3) (i) is also in accord
with other long-arm statutes that have been held constitutional by
state courts where jurisdiction was sought on the basis of a
single tort. 0 The contacts described in 302(a) (3) (i) were de-
35 Id. at 316.
36357 U.S. 235 (1958).
37 Id. at 253.3 8 See 9B U=NRwO LAws ANxOTAEmD § 1.03, Commissioners' Note 312
(1966). In Gray, with apparently no proof on the matter, the court
assumed that the defendant had received the benefits of substantial sales
in Illinois. 1 WIN Ts , KoRN & MILLER, Naw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
11302.10 (1966).3 0jackson v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Va.
1965). The applicable provisions of VA. CODE AwN. §8-81.2 (Supp. 1966)
were: "(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from
the persons . . . (5) Causing injury in this State to any person by breach
of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside
this State when he might have reasonably expected such person to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods in this State, provided that he also
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed
or services rendered in this State."
Although 302(a) (3) (i) has no foreseeability requirement, one might
be implied particularly in light of the framers' intent that the amendment
not be so broad as to unreasonably burden non-residents who could not
be expected to foresee that their acts outside New York would have harm-
ful consequences in New York. See Judicial Conference Report, supra
note 18, at 2788.
do Note, CPLR-Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Domiciliaries Who Com-
mit Tortious Acts Outside New York, 33 BROOKLYx L. REv. 107, 110
1968 ]
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signed to assure the constitutionality of the provision 41 and they
would seem to be sufficient "minimum contacts" with New York
within the meaning of International Shoe and Hanson since they
are direct and the defendant invokes the benefits and protections
of the laws of New York. In addition, since by these contacts the
non-resident defendant can be said to be "purposefully availing"
itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York, only
an extremely strict interpretation of Hanson would prevent this
section from being constitutional.
CPLR 302(a) (3) (ii)
Under 302 (a) (3) (ii), two elements must be present to make
a non-resident subject to personal jurisdiction: foreseeability of
forum consequences and derivation of substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce. The Judicial Conference
Report upon which the amendment was based seems to justify
302 (a) (3) (ii) largely on the fact that it seems fair and desirable
that a defendant who could foresee consequences in New York and
who derives substantial revenue from interstate and international
commerce be required to handle litigation away from his business
location.
42
Those who advocate the constitutionality of 302 (a) (3) (ii)
rely on a liberal interpretation of the Hanson case and feel that,
in light of developments in the field of products liability,4 3 it is
not unfair to require a non-resident manufacturer who knowingly
sends his product into another state to appear and defend in the
state where his product has caused injury.4 4  From their view-
point, 302 (a) (3) (ii) is a welcome step away from the lingering
doctrine of presence and should, therefore, be held constitutionally
valid.
The difficulty with (ii) seems to be that the legislature, in
its haste to correct the situation brought about by the Feathers
case, has set a statutory standard that may not meet the "minimum
contacts" requirements of International Shoe and Hanson in certain
situations. A non-domiciliary might derive substantial revenue
from interstate or international commerce and yet have no "con-
tact" with New York since no part of the revenue need come
(1966). See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E2d 673 (1957);
Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1954);
Painter v. Home Finance Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957).
41 See Homburger & Laufer, supra note 23, at 71; Note, stpra note 40.
42Judicial Conference Report, supra note 18, at 2788.
43 See, e.g., Jackson v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962
(W.D. Va. 1965).
44Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 548-49; Homburger & Laufer,
supra note 23, at 77-80.
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from this state.4 5 In such a case, foreseeability of New York conse-
quences is the only element which approaches a "contact" by the
efendant with New York. While foreseeability has been regarded
as an element or part of jurisdictional basis, 48 it alone will not
satisfy due process requirements for in personam jurisdiction,4 7
and it was not the intent of the legislature that it should.
4S
For example, D, a California surfboard manufacturer who sells
his custom-designed boards throughout the Western United States,
Peru, France, and South Africa, sells a surfboard to P, a New
York resident, during an international surfing competition in Cali-
fornia in which P is an entrant. P buys the surfboard while in
California because D has no distributor in New York. While
surfing in New York, P is severely injured when the board splits
due to a latent structural defect. Since D obviously derived most
of his income from interstate and international commerce, pre-
sumably he could be required, by virtue of CPLR 302(a) (3) (ii),
to defend an action brought by P in New York if the foresee-
ability of the forum consequences could be established.
As illustrated above, the difficulty with 302(a) (3) (ii) is that it
fails to sufficiently set a standard by which jurisdiction can be
determined-standards thus far set by the courts-and it fails
to accurately reflect the legislative intent expressed in the Judicial
Conference Report. A "one shot" business transaction can be
the basis of jurisdiction under 302 (a) (3) (ii) provided the in-state
consequence was foreseeable and the "substantial revenue" re-
quirement was met. However, the Judicial Conference sought to
exclude non-domiciliaries whose activities in interstate commerce
were not extensive or whose business operations were primarily
of a local character.4 9
Certainly a large scale manufacturer whose product is widely
distributed in interstate commerce would meet the Conference's
standard; just as certainly, the standard would not be met by a
manufacturer whose activities were on a small scale or geographi-
cally restricted.50 As a test to determine whether the substantial
revenue requirement of 302(a) (3) (ii) is met, merely comparing
interstate or international gross sales revenue with total gross
sales revenue as in the Gillmore case appears inadequate. For
example, in the surfboard hypothetical, the manufacturer may have
derived 90 percent of his total revenue from interstate or inter-
d See Note, supra note 40.
4GSee Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 648 (N.D.
Ill. 1965).
47 See the example given by the court in Erlanger Mills Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
48 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 18, at 2789-90.
AoId. at 2788-89.
SO Id.
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national commerce. It is clear that even though he derived sub-
stantial revenue from interstate or international commerce under
the Gillnore test, he would nevertheless not be "generally equipped
to handle litigation away from his business location." 51
Conclusion
Seemingly, CPLR 302(a) (3) will withstand constitutional
objections in principle, if not in all applications, as one authority
has noted. 52 Probably most difficulty will arise with respect to
302 (a) (3) (ii). However, even that subsection may withstand
constitutional attack in a proper case. For example, if suit is
brought in New York against a large nation-wide manufacturer
whose activities in and revenue derived from New York are not
sufficient to meet the requirements of 302 (a) (3) (i), but whose
revenue is largely derived from interstate and international com-
merce, an application of 302(a) (3) (ii) would probably be allowed
to stand. It is almost certain that if (ii) encounters its first
constitutional test in a case presenting facts similar to the surfboard
hypothetical, it will fail. If 302(a) (3) (ii) is to withstand all
constitutional objections it must either be construed by the courts
of New York so as to meet due process requirements or it must
be amended by the legislature.
Until there is a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality
of obtaining jurisdiction over a non-resident for tortious acts out-
side the state causing injury within the state, the constitutional
status of 302(a) (3) will remain uncertain.
CPLR 302(a)(3): Situs of injury in unfair competition action is
where plaintiff lost business.
Aside from the substantial revenue conundrum of CPLR
302(a) (3) discussed above, there has been a most recent develop-
ment in another requirement of 302(a) (3) long-arm jurisdiction,
51Id. One source has noted that 302(a)(3)(ii) could raise a consti-
tutional question under the commerce clause if it placed an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long Arm
Statute, 16 BUFFAwO L. Rnv. 67, 79 (1966). However, since an activity
that would give rise to the cause of action occurred within the state,
i.e., the injury, this factor would seem to prevent an undue burden on
interstate commerce. Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Juris-
diction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 986 (1960). Since the cases on commerce
clause limitations of jurisdiction proscribe only oppressive and unreasonable
burdens, the public interest favors a correlative duty on one who enjoys
large scale access and operations in interstate or international commerce
to appear, in certain situations, in the forum of the tort victim to litigate
a claim. Homburger & Laufer, supra at 79-80.52 Homburger & Laufer, supra note 51, at 76.
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